Utilizing county-level data, this paper predicts the growth in the number of private industrial research laboratories between 1960 and 1985. This was a period of rapid growth and spatial reorganization in industrial research activity. A multi-equation model which allows the influence of unmeasured factors and selectivity to be taken into account is used to test the ability of a policy intervention, research parks, to affect the growth in the number of local laboratories. Although the presence of research parks is correlated with the number of laboratories, the analysis indicates that research parks were not effective local development tools but instead benefitted from the growth of research activity.
of industrial activity, research and development, in locations where it would otherwise not take place. As policy tools, research parks are not merely real estate ventures, however. They may be able to achieve the desired ends by demonstrating the advantages of a particular locality to industrial decision-makers even if much of the economic activity they are intended to attract is located outside their boundaries.
As policy interventions in research and development, science parks can be contrasted with financial support for research or for the products of the research process. Government demand for research, as evidenced by military spending and the space program, has had major effects on the supply of research (National Science Board, 2001) . Government regulation of industry also causes research to be performed, as in the automobile and pharmaceutical industries. Such demand-based policy interventions differ from research parks in that the geographical effects are largely incidental for the former and the supply 226 S.J. Appold / Research Policy 33 (2004) [225] [226] [227] [228] [229] [230] [231] [232] [233] [234] [235] [236] [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] effects, if they occur at all, are indirect for research parks.
Research parks are policy interventions that are well-suited to local elite growth coalitions because they build on the policy variables most directly under local control. Some urban theorists have suggested that it is no longer the locations which are well-endowed with resources that will attract firms and the ensuing employment growth, but the locations that are able to mobilize the resources firms need (Logan and Molotch, 1987) . Such local coalitions may have little effect on the demand for research but they often control property and benefit directly or indirectly from its use. Location-specific "rentiers", who gain from the economic activity of others, may mobilize resources in an attempt to create externalities based on technological spillovers in the form of research parks. Real estate developers, universities, and local governments are among those for whom growth in the local area most directly translates into benefit and so most likely to be active in such efforts. In fact, all known research parks are the products of such public and private actors.
Research parks institutionalize, or at least symbolize (Massey et al., 1992) , the external economies of localization afforded by an industry-universitygovernment alliance. They attempt to replicate the high level of interaction often associated with urbanization without the baggage of an older industrial heritage. Research parks, then, are a form of industrial recruitment. They are similar to other property-based interventions such as development and enterprise zones. While enterprise zones have been shown to be largely ineffective (Bondonio and Engberg, 2000) , the efficacy of research parks as local economic development tools is only rarely empirically investigated. 1 This historical study examines the effectiveness of research parks in attracting research activity to localities. It compares the number of industrial research laboratories in 1985 in localities which, by the mid-1960s, had mounted measurable campaigns to accelerate lo-cal growth by forming research parks with the number of laboratories in those localities which did not mount similar resource mobilization campaigns. A prospective study of 3024 US counties between 1960 and 1985 that can separate the selection effects from the treatment (causal) effects of research parks was performed. The 1960-1985 time period was a critical time in US history with a major spatial and sectoral restructuring underway in which New York lost its dominant position as a center of innovation and the Midwest declined in economic importance.
In broad outline, there are three possible outcomes of the policy intervention:
Research parks could prove to be effective policy interventions that independently attract research activity to an area. That activity may be located on or off the park. (An evaluation of their performance as real estate ventures might examine only the tenants attracted to the park itself.) A research park could be successful by providing operational benefits, such as eased access to technical knowledge, or symbolic benefits, such as a location seen as appropriate by the business community, or both.
More somberly, research parks could turn out to be counter-productive. Parks might decrease the amount of research activity in an area from what it otherwise would have been. Such a possibility sounds (and is) perverse but negative signaling has been held responsible for the unfavorable outcomes sometimes associated with training programs and public housing (Spence, 1974) . 2 Finally, even if the amount of research performed in an area increased, research parks could be shown to be superfluous. That is, a correlation between the presence of a research park and the amount of research performed in an area could be spurious. In this case, the development would have occurred anyway and the investments in the intervention would have been wasted despite the positive outcome. In the case of research parks, an added risk is that others, attempting to duplicate the apparent success of one area, will replicate an ineffective policy. The risk of mistaking correlation for cause is underlined by the many attempts to "grow the next Silicon Valley (Miller and Cote, 1987) 
The last two possible outcomes may be due in part to different types of selection effects, that is, a situation where the probability of engaging in an intervention is determined by factors that also determine the outcome. In the case of counter-productivity, a possibly useful intervention, such as vocational training, may be rendered ineffective by the (well-founded or not) belief on the part of potential employers that only those who are undesirable as employees participate in the sponsored training. Participation in the program then (justly or not) acts as an indicator of unobserved attributes. Adverse selection is, of course, endemic in policy interventions. Policy intervention is often most wanted where least likely to succeed. In the case of superfluity, those with above average potential are more likely to participate in the intervention. Additional education and occupational choice are the most common examples of self-selection (Roy, 1951) . The possibility is very plausible for research parks in that mainly those areas with the most promise might mount such interventions. In both cases, unobserved factors could play a major role.
Several factors, taken together, make the contention that research parks, as property-based market interventions, would be effective in the 1960-1985 period in the US credible, however. First, the amount of research performed grew. Second, the aggregate regional distribution of population, employment, and research changed during that time period. Third, the spatial distribution of good universities in 1960 was partially independent of industrial location in US. Thus, while the increase in research performed and the changing spatial distribution provided opportunities for local recruitment efforts, the accidents of history that endowed many localities with a high level of intellectual resources formed a solid foundation for recruitment efforts. Moreover, examining the effect of research parks formed by the mid-1960s pre-dates the possibility of over-supply.
Unfortunately, much of what is known about the efficacy of research parks as local economic development tools is based on flawed research designs. Many of the studies select research sites post hoc, after a substantial degree of development has occurred. That is, the sample is on the dependent variable. A fair basis of comparison is needed. Even studies that compare experiences across places do not leave open the possibility that unmeasured factors might affect outcomes. Some of those measured and unmeasured factors may affect both the outcomes of interest and the likelihood of mounting an intervention. Without taking those considerations into account, the possibility of a selectivity bias is large. The analyses may mistake selection effects for treatment effects. Therefore, this study will use a model capable of measuring selection effects.
Research laboratories and local growth
As outlined above, three factors underlie the possible efficacy of research parks as policy interventions: the growth of research, the spatial restructuring of the population, and the pre-existing distribution of good university departments. In addition, a range of surveys and case studies (Dorfman, 1983; Galbraith, 1985; Hekman, 1980; Lund, 1986; Premus, 1982) suggest the effective operation of laboratories might require the ready access to a supply of well-educated labor, with the nearby availability of a wide range of higher level services, and with the flow of a wide range of goods afforded by population. These factors might create external economies that would affect the location decisions of firm managers. Table 1 (Panel A) shows information relevant to that efficacy: the population of the US in 1960 and 1985, the number of private industrial laboratories in those two years, the number of Fortune 500 firm headquarters, the number of distinguished university departments in four fields important in industrial research, and the means of the median number of years of schooling for the adult population, the percent of the work force engaged in white collar occupations, the percent of the work force employed in finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industries, and the median household income for each county in 1960, and the number of research parks. Data sources are listed in Appendix A. Many of the rapidly growing areas expanded on the basis of offering a less expensive production site than that afforded by much of the Midwest and Northeast. Improved road transport including an expanding Interstate highway system, increasing air passenger service brought about by developments in jet engines, and historical wage differentials combined to allow the increasing dispersion of the routinized production of standardized goods.
At the same time research also moved to newer locations and it often preceded the movement of manufacturing. For example, one Chicago-based firm, Motorola, established a research laboratory in Arizona in the early 1950s-long before it established manufacturing facilities in the region. As privileged institutions in an emerging information economy (Bell, 1973, p. 116; Bohme and Stehr, 1986, p. 12 ) research laboratories are sometimes believed to generate significant support activities and to also attract the high skill manufacturing operations of their parent firms (Malecki, 1997) . Areas with a strong representation of high technology industries, those most likely to utilize on-going research, grew during the 1960-1985 period, while areas with less knowledge-intensive bases did not (Castells, 1985) . Research was an attractive target for industrial recruitment. It is a high value-added activity that had additional employment spillovers. Table 1 (Panel B) shows that urbanization clearly had an effect on the spatial distribution of laboratories. Over 90% of the laboratories were located in metropolitan counties in 1960. That percentage had decreased somewhat by 1985. Fifty-five percent of all labs were located in the 49 counties which comprise the cores of the largest metropolitan areas in 1960 and two-thirds of all labs in the US were located in 181 core and outlying counties comprising the largest metropolitan areas at that time. Only 8% were located in rural counties. Those proportions changed somewhat over the following 25 years with the outlying counties of the largest metropolitan areas becoming the preferred location for new laboratory locations, as the growth rates and location quotients suggest. Between 1960 and 1985, industrial research moved down the metropolitan hierarchy.
While population shifted out of older industrial areas, such as the Middle Atlantic and the East North Central Census regions, to the South and West in the 1960-1985 period, Table 1 (Panel C) shows that the regional distribution of laboratories also changedbut not necessarily in the direction of the population. In 1960, one-third of the industrial laboratories were in the Middle Atlantic and another fourth were in the East North Central region. By 1985, the Middle Atlantic had lost its preeminent position while the South Atlantic and Pacific regions increased their share of the country's research. Note that the share of research compared to share of the population was highest in New England in 1960 and that ratio increased over the following 25 years while the corresponding ratios for the Pacific region were at the national average in 1960 and 1985. While it could be said that research rose on population trends in the Far West, the opposite occurred in New England. The urbanization measure, the region measure, and their interaction account for 61% of variation in the (logged) number of labs by county in 1960 and 57% in 1985. High technology industry tends to be located in places with a well-developed technological infrastructure, often incorporated in a university. In the mid-1960s, 78 universities and 178 different departments were located in the 65 counties that contained at least one ranked PhD-granting department in one of four critical fields relevant to industrial research: biochemistry, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, and pharmacology. The location of good science and engineering departments was decided, in part, by state government budget decisions and elite philanthropy. The latter was often based on fortunes made in fields that were not especially research intensive and so, somewhat reflect the locations in which those fortunes were made. Many of the institutions were the product of an industrial elite that sought to solidity its identity through the formation of non-profit organizations (DiMaggio, 1982) . Others were the product of a national movement to improve technology development and transfer, institutionalized in the Morrill Act of 1862, that was modeled on European institutions. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, was the product of the Boston industrial elite and received a large share of Massachusetts Morrill Act funds. Many of these universities were remade by academic entrepreneurs.
Universities, however, may not exert a strong hold on laboratories. There is a poor correlation between the number of laboratories within a specialty and the strength of nearby university departments (Appold, 1991) and university-business connections are often weak or non-existent even in the most vibrant high technology agglomerations (Oakey, 1984; Westhead and Storey, 1995) . Table 1 shows that laboratories increasingly were located in the outlying counties of large metropolitan areas-places that house few good universities. The regional effect of universities is unclear. Some counties with universities lost laboratories. The county containing Marquette University, on Michigan's Northern Peninsula, had one lab in 1960 and no labs by 1985. Similarly, the county in which the University of Illinois at Champaign, Urbana, with a top ten engineering department, is located contained five labs in 1960 but no labs in 1985.
Other factors might play a role in the location of research laboratories. Corporations might prefer to hold high-level services such as research close to corporate decision-making. Fortune 500 firms were located in 132 counties. New York County (Manhattan) claimed the highest number of firms with 128 headquarters. Table 1 indicates that, on the whole, research moved away from the regions with the heaviest representation of 1960 Fortune 500 headquarters.
The quality of the local labor force could have an effect on the location of laboratories. Information on the median number of years of education attained by those aged 25 and over, the percentage of the labor force in white collar occupations, the percentage of the labor force employed in the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors, and median family income are shown in Table 1 . The mean county median years of education was 9.6. The mean percentage of county residents engaged in white collar occupations was 31.1 and the mean percentage employed in finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) was 2.2. The mean county median family income was US$ 4170 in 1960. Marked variations between counties exist for each variable. The differences do not seem to predict the 1985 distribution of laboratories. The central city counties of large metropolitan areas have the highest means for each of these variables but such counties became less important as locations for research over the following 25 years.
If research laboratories are not particularly tied to the resources offered by particular places, they were ripe targets for recruitment. High technology firms have relatively short lists of requirements which can be filled by almost any metropolitan area and they are not particularly sensitive to local tax rates (Schmenner, 1982) . While research activities require ample supplies of well-trained labor, that labor is mobile. Professionals were almost twice as likely to migrate as others (Ladinsky, 1967) and those in high technology occupations not to differ in destination preference from other occupations (Herzog et al., 1986) . With the high level of growth in research and development and the high level of geographic mobility, could local elites mount effective interventions to attract and channel the growth in research and development?
Research parks as development tools
Learning from the history of the Boston area, explicit attempts to create innovation-intense environments that build on research parks have multiplied. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was founded in 1862 and by the early 1900s gained the explicit support of a coalition of large industrial firms-many of which were located outside of New England (Noble, 1977) . MIT became perhaps the first US university with a national constituency. The outlines of the contemporary university-industrygovernment technology alliance began emerging before 1920 when Vannevar Bush, then an MIT associate professor, helped found the forerunner of Raytheon (Castells and Hall, 1994; Roberts, 1991) . Bush later advised the President and helped decide wartime research policy and subsequently became vice president of the university. By 1960, a host of other technology-based firms, some with direct connections to the university, had been founded in the Boston area including Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier (1931), Wang (a Harvard graduate) (1951 ), Digital Equipment Corporation (1957 , and many others.
The first explicit attempt to build a high technology region by distilling and imitating the features of the Boston region is often attributed to Stanford University, located in Santa Clara county, once an agricultural area on the southern fringe of the San Francisco metropolitan area. Upon returning from a sojourn in Boston, Frederick Terman, an electrical engineering professor at Stanford (later to become vice president) emerged as a point person for the local growth coalition. Terman utilized a then (early 1950s) innovative policy tool-a research park, calling it "our secret weapon" (Saxenian, 1985, p. 24) . Unlike the Boston technical complex which unfolded over a longer period of time and through the actions of a broader set of individuals, some researchers believe that the growth of Silicon Valley would not have occurred without specific goal-directed intervention on the part of the growth coalition. "The role of Stanford University, and specifically that of its visionary vice-president, Frederick Terman, was critical to the beginning of Silicon Valley. . . . [W] ithout Fred Terman, Silicon Valley might never have happened" (Rogers and Larson, 1984, pp. 30-31) .
The place of research parks in the mystique of high technology development was solidified by the development of Research Triangle Park (RTP, established 1958) , where Howard Odum, very early in the process, realized the potential of university-industry cooperation in regional economic development and a small coalition of government leaders (including two governors acting in the tradition of Southern progressives), private businessmen and university representatives organized the Park (Moriarity, 1986) . Buoyed by the apparent success of Route 128 and of efforts, such as those in Silicon Valley and North Carolina, to stimulate local economic growth based on a high level of innovation, arguments by extension have led to attempts to create an increasing number of new industrial places. Since the 1950s such ambitions, legitimated and solidified by a concern for national security and a worry about declining industrial competitiveness, have spread throughout the US and, accelerating markedly since 1980, to a growing number of countries in Europe (Castells and Hall, 1994; Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Regional Studies, 1999) and Asia (Bass, 1998; Shin, 2001) .
Although new in the early 1950s, by the mid-1960s, research parks had become differentiated from industrial parks and were fairly common in the US. There were 149 research parks listed in 116 counties during the 1960s. The heaviest concentration of parks appears to be in the greater Boston area where a single real estate firm, Cabot, Cabot and Forbes, had established 13 parks, forming much of the facilities backbone of the Route 128 belt. That firm also developed research parks in other metropolitan areas. Of the 46 research parks found in 1962, 11 were no longer active in 1966. Table 2 shows that the counties containing laboratories in 1960 differed from those without laboratories by being more populous, being more likely to have a prestigious university department, having a higher percentage of employment in white collar and FIRE, and by having residents with higher level of income and schooling. Among the 580 counties containing labs in 1960, those with research parks (most of which were formed after 1960) also differed from the other counties with laboratories in the same ways. The 25 counties which contained a research park but had no labs in 1960 differed markedly from those counties which contained both labs and a research park. They were also less populous than those counties which contained labs but no parks and contained no Fortune 500 headquarters or prominent university departments. Those counties also had a lower representation of FIRE employment and lower median incomes. On the other hand, they added an average of 4.4 laboratories over the subsequent 25 years and they turned out to add population more quickly. These figures suggest that the attempts to form research parks may be dependent on the research activities already present and the characteristics, including the social organization, of the counties.
Ninety of the 116 counties (78%) with research parks as of the mid-1960s already contained research laboratories in 1960-predating the establishment of most parks. Only in 25 counties were the parks faced with attracting the first laboratory to the area. Of these parks, 14 were successful in attracting at least one lab by 1985; 11 were not. The 14 parks which did succeed in attracting labs were in more populous counties to begin with and those counties did not lose population during the period. Three hundred seventy nine additional counties which contained no labs in 1960 also added labs, suggesting that the presence of a research park may not be necessary for a high innovation area to develop. On the other hand, of the 90 counties which had at least one lab in 1960 and also a research park, three lost all the labs which had been there in 1960. Of the 489 counties containing laboratories in 1960 but not a research park, 17% lost all their labs. The high level of failure among laboratories and parks begins to raise questions about the necessity and sufficiency of research parks in creating innovation-intensive environments.
A closer look at the several case histories of centers of high technology industry also raises questions about the efficacy of research parks as development tools. While a university-sponsored industrial park is sometimes credited with propelling Santa Clara County from a bucolic agricultural center to a high technology industrial dynamo, Terman's efforts to attract industry may not have been necessary. Silicon Valley already contained significant private research activity and knowledge-intensive manufacturing before the Stanford Park was established. The region is on the outskirts of what was, and is, a major metropolitan area. Nationwide post-war suburbanization trends may have ensured that the area be not too different from what it is today, in any case. Further, Robert Noyce, an MIT PhD who co-founded Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel, has stated that local universities played no major role in the development of the semiconductor industry in the Bay Area (Braun and MacDonald, 1982) . This claim is bolstered by the fact that the national business press often mentions the involvement of other universities in industry but, at least through 1970, rarely Stanford or UC Berkeley.
Similarly, the Triangle is a Southern metropolitan area and differential regional growth patterns alone may account for much of the growth evidenced over the last several decades. The Triangle area was also on the fringe of the prosperous manufacturing belt of North Carolina's Piedmont. Aggregate population and industrial trends may be major factors in explaining the emergence of innovation intensive environments.
The founding of research parks does not appear to be independent of the characteristics of the location in which it was located, raising the possibility of selection effects. Rather than mobilizing diffuse local (Peterson, 1980) . Even so, the degree of freedom enjoyed and the effectiveness of policy may be quite limited. Nation-wide research does not often find support for the effectiveness of local growth policy interventions. Kasarda and Irwin (1991) found "Federal-fiscal disparity," presumably the result of organized political efforts, to have little effect on local employment growth. Further, Carlino and Mills (1987) found that issuing Industrial Revenue Bonds to reduce the costs of capital to firms and tax rates have no measurable effect on employment growth. The case study evidence for the efficacy of growth coalitions is, however, also mixed. Pittsburgh has evidently not been able to benefit from a strong decades-old elite coalition (Chinitz, 1961) . The lack of evidence for the efficacy of the common policy instruments of growth coalitions raises several questions. Is there self-selection in the promotion of research parks? Would growth in the amount of research have occurred in the absence of such activities? Are research parks spurious to local growth? Does the successful development of research parks depend upon previous development?
Estimating the effect of a research park on growth in the number of labs
The characteristics of counties in the 1960s, including the presence of a research park, were used to predict the number of laboratories in 1985. Because the attracting characteristics of particular counties may not be sufficient to surmount a threshold resulting in a positive number of labs, Tobit models are used. Table 3 presents three types of models: (1) Three variables that were initially thought to be important in determining the number of laboratories in a county, the percent of the work force in the FIRE sector, the presence of Fortune 500 corporate headquarters, and the median years of schooling, turned out not to be significant in any specification and are not included in the results shown.
The results of initial estimations of simple Tobit equations are shown as Models A1 and A2 in Table 3 . The number of laboratories in the county in 1960 has a positive, but diminishing, effect on the number of labs observed 25 years later. County population also has a positive effect on the number of labs in 1985. Somewhat contrary to the common cross-sectional findings, the number of Fortune 500 firms headquartered in a county (not shown) and the presence of nationally-ranked university departments do not have significant effects. Including a dummy variable in Model A2 to represent the presence of a research park appears to decrease the effect of white collar employment and university departments on the number of labs in 1985. The presence of a research park (Model A2), on the other hand, does appear to significantly increase the number of labs observed in counties in 1985. That conclusion, however, would be premature. A large literature dating from the 1970s and continuing to the present suggests that such a model can over-estimate the effect of an intervention such as a research park (e.g. Barnow et al., 1980) . Model B uncouples the counties with and without research parks. The separate equations allow all parameters to vary, rather than only the intercept term (which is what the dummy variable in Model A2 does). The results suggest that county characteristics, including 1960 population and number of laboratories in 1960, have a stronger influence on the number of laboratories in 1985 in counties without research parks than they do in counties that contain parks. A Wald test shows that the null hypothesis of the joint equality of the parameters must be rejected. The probit equation, however, indicates that the characteristics of the county which determined the number of labs in 1985, also determined whether the county contained a research park. The independent equation formulations estimated in Models A and B implies that each of the explanatory variables is exogenous. That is, as in experimental research, counties are randomly assigned to a "treatment" or a "control" group. It may be, however, as suggested above, that the existence of a research park in a county is neither an exogenous nor random event but rather determined by characteristics of counties which are both observed and unobserved. Some counties might benefit more than others from a park and so might be more likely to develop one. (Much as those who feel they would benefit from a university education, might be more likely to obtain one than other persons.) Any selectivity in the development of a research park would be shown in a correlation of the error terms in the respective equations. Moreover, the implication of the seemingly unrelated regression framework (Kmenta, 1971 ) is that any unobserved factors that have an effect on both the number of labs in 1985 and on the presence of a research park, would also be seen in such a correlation.
I use a switching model that is formulated to deal with endogenous selection when unobserved attributes might affect both the decision to promote a research park and the growth in the number of laboratories. Because the error terms could incorporate many of the same unobserved county characteristics, the error terms are allowed to correlate. This helps isolate the effects of systematic underlying causes from the causal effect of the development of a research park itself. The basic form of the model, as discussed by Maddala (1983, p. 261) and Greene (1992, p. 649 and 651) is
(for counties with research parks) (1)
(for counties with no park) (2)
where The model is most often used to test for the effect of social programs, certifications, and laws when it is possible that the same factors which cause their presence, make them superfluous (Lee, 1978; Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; Willis and Rosen, 1979) . In fact, the true independent causal (treatment) effects have generally been over-estimated by single and independent equation specifications such as those in Models A and B.
That model (Model C) indicates that the set of factors determining the number of laboratories in 1985 and the presence of a research park substantially overlap. The number of laboratories in a county, its population, white collar employment, and the presence of a prominent university department affect both outcomes. The median income also affects the number of laboratories in 1985. (Maddala, 1983, pp. 120-123 and 136-137) states that such a selectivity model is identified even when the set of predictors exactly overlap. Evidence for a positive but decreasing relationship between the number of laboratories and population in 1960, on the one hand, and the two outcomes (the presence of a park and the number of laboratories in 1985), on the other, is weak. Removing the squared terms does not appreciably affect the model fit.
The Wald test for the equality of the parameters of the two Tobit equations indicates that the null hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected. If the hypothesis of equal parameters were to be rejected, that would be evidence for the direct, causal effect of research parks. The presence of a research park and the attendant promotional and operational effects does not appear to increase the number of labs in a county. The overall stability of the other parameters suggest that no major problems in estimation have occurred.
The interpretation of the correlation between the error terms of the selection and outcome equations of such models is still controversial. One frequent interpretation of a positive correlation among error terms is of optimal sorting (Trost, 1981) . That is, the counties most likely to benefit from a research park will develop one. The negative correlation of error terms in Model C suggests that negative selectivity predominates. That is, counties with some positive fundamentals such as population size and a favorable occupational and sectoral mix but possibly lacking on some unobserved factors are the ones most likely to promote research parks. Public interventions are, in fact, often meant to address shortcomings. Another possible interpretation of the negative correlation among the error terms is that there is considerable variation among the counties where research parks are located (Kenny et al., 1979, p. 785) . Research parks had a range in the level of backing and, arguably, thus in the direction and level of selection. It is plausible that the commercial development of research parks was largely the product of positive selection-that is, promoters developed parks in the counties where the laboratories were planning to locate anyway-and that public sector development of research parks was largely the result of negative selection-that is, public actors became involved in the development of research parks precisely because the number of laboratories locating in a locality was, for some reason, below expectation. Research parks have been developed for a variety of motivations (Macdonald, 1987) . 3 The high level of correlation between the error terms in the two equations indicates that the presence of a research park is not exogenous and that unobserved factors are acting on both dependent variables. In other words, the factors that are causing growth in the number of labs are also causing the promotion of research parks. This implies that the relationship between elite promotional efforts in the form of the development of research parks and the growth in the number of laboratories in an area are largely spurious. The apparent positive effects of research parks on the number of research laboratories in an area appears to be largely selectivity in where the parks are developed.
3 I also estimated an endogenous dummy variable formulation of a system of simultaneous equations similar to that used by Heckman (1976); Edwards (1978) and Barnow et al. (1980 ) (discussed in Greene (1992 ). The form of the model is: 
Conclusions
In 1960, Lichtenberg (1960) published a volume of the Regional Plan Association's large multi-author study of the greater New York region titled, "One Tenth of a Nation". That same year, Vernon (1960) published another installment in the series in which he outlined a theory of intensely-innovative environments and their relationship with their surrounding regions. That theory explained the continuing viability of the New York region in the face of high business costs in terms of the unduplicable advantages of a large pool of highly skilled labor, intense interaction and feedback, and a range of support services that supported artistic and technological innovation. According to Vernon, New York was the innovation center of the United States and, by extension, the world (Vernon, 1966) . The presence of over 130 of headquarters of the largest 500 US industrial firms including some of the largest and most progressive technological corporations in the world such as AT&T, IBM, and RCA, the Wall Street financial district, the Madison Avenue advertising complex, a concentration of arts facilities, a high density of universities, corporate laboratories such as that of Bell Labs with over 1000 research scientists and engineers on staff, and a string of high technology pioneers located in the suburbs including the earliest commercial manufacturers of transistors, Vernon's analysis of the relationship between innovation and geographic space had the ring of inevitability. Today, such assertions about regional cumulative advantage are repeated for other places.
The Regional Plan Association's study is valuable today largely because the many of the central presuppositions were wrong. The greater New York area is no longer ten percent of the nation and while New York may be heir to some of Vernon's predictions, despite the impressive resources of the region, the metropolitan area is no longer the center of technological innovation. Today, research and development (and high technology industry in general) is agglomerated into tight knots of intensely innovative activity variously termed industrial districts (Piore and Sebel, 1984) , innovative mileux (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988) , technopoles (Castells and Hall, 1994) , or, more recently, learning regions (Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1999) that are sprinkled across the US.
Many case studies of emerging and, by now, well-established technopoles in the US and elsewhere have been used to argue that local actors can purposefully create environments that capture or accelerate technological innovation and thereby attract firms and employment away from established centers. Such a hypothesis becomes plausible because the resources needed for innovation are all mobile. In contrast to good farm land or mineral deposits which are largely determined outside the social system, the geographic distribution of the key elements of innovation: high skill labor, technological infrastructure, business services, and the opportunity for interaction are all socially determined.
Nevertheless, while this analysis finds changing spatial patterns of research that discount Lichtenberg and Vernon's stand on regional cumulative advantage, it uncovered no evidence that coordinated action by land developers, local boosters and local public authorities in the form of research parks can sway that pattern. Research parks appear not to be effective local economic development tools. Several failed to attract any research activity, but, more importantly, many are located in areas which already had significant levels of research activity. For the one Research Triangle Park there is a Thousand Oaks, north of Los Angeles, a Swearingen in Norman, Oklahoma and a Sterling Forest in Rockland County, New York-parks which have not been successful in attracting significant research activity. For every Terman at Stanford and Odum at North Carolina there were dozens of other visionaries building bridges between the university, industry, and state. Bridges that were never crossed.
Counties with research parks do attract more industrial research laboratories, on average, than those without but this is due to the measured and unmeasured characteristics of the counties in which they are located. Unfortunately, the identity of large research parks within counties is lost. Therefore, intra-county effects cannot be examined with these data. In some counties, the parks themselves have failed while the number of labs in the area has grown. Despite being sponsored by the well-funded and well-connected Harriman family, Sterling Forest failed to attract a threshold of activity and was sub-divided and subsequently sold off (Conant, 2002) .
The number of labs already present in 1960 and the size of the county population appear to be the most important determinants of growth in the number of research labs. These, of course, are beyond the direct control of growth coalitions. The lack of effect of universities on growth in the number of labs may be somewhat surprising to some but is consonant with much of the detailed work on the role of universities in knowledge-intensive industries.
The significance and positive direction of the number of labs in 1960 on the growth in the number of labs suggest that a good deal of the power to mobilize resources in the economic system resides not in the hands of development-oriented elites or, for that matter, diffused widely throughout the locality but is in the hands of the population of firms. Research parks appear to more successful if at least some laboratories are already located nearby. Further, detailed case histories of specific parks, such as Research Triangle Park, suggest that success may be dependent upon recruiting a high status lead firm. Only once RTP was successful in recruiting IBM, did other firms without local linkages follow.
The findings presented here are hardly the final word, more sophisticated models may be able to capture different effects of public and private interventions. Innovation is notoriously difficult to measure and many of the measures are known to be biased and unreliable. Only one measure of research activity, the number of research laboratories, was used here. Other measures may produce different results but the findings extend, with more extensive data for a longer, historically-critical time period, those found by Luger and Goldstein (1991) , Shearmur and Deloreax (2000) , and Wallsten (2001) . The findings here indicate that research parks were ineffective policy interventions and that not the parks but unobserved, and possibly elusive, forces were at work in determining the location of research and development activities. The ability to shape the geography of innovation through local policy efforts appears to be limited.
Appendix A. Data sources
The sample used in the analysis consists of the 3024 counties in the continental United States for which full data were available. The Census Bureau did not release the values for one or more variables used in the analysis for several counties with 1960 populations below 1000. Independent cities in several states are combined with nearby or surrounding counties.
The population data for 1960 and 1985 are taken from the Country Statistics Data File 4 (CO-STAT 4) data file. Urbanization was measured by classifying counties according to metropolitan status and size of the largest city (Beale and Fuguitt, 1978) .
The categorizations, modifications of those suggested by Calvin Beale, based on the population of the largest city and inclusion in or adjacency to a metropolitan area are as follows: , 1985) . The location was collected for each laboratory separately and county summaries computed. Although the source is the most comprehensive and authoritative listing available, as with all other such archival data, the listings are subject to the judgements and efforts of the publisher.
Information on the existence of good PhD-granting departments in four fields relevant to industrial research, biochemistry, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, and pharmacology, was compiled from Cartter's (1966) An Assessment of Quality in Graduate Education. The ratings were established by surveying academics in the respective fields. Ratings tend to be conservative and correlate well across related departments within an institution. Therefore, counties were coded zero or one depending upon whether there was at least one ranked department within its borders or not.
Information on the number of corporate headquarters was compiled from the July 1960 issue of Fortune magazine. One firm was headquartered in Hawaii.
The social data are taken from the County and City Data Book Consolidated File (1947 File ( -1977 .
Information on the existence of research parks has been compiled from two listings originally published in the August 1962 and August 1966 issues of Industrial Development (Conway, 1962 (Conway, , 1966 . Conway Publications, the publisher of Industrial Development, was an early proponent of research parks and had established a rating system for industrial parks as well as research parks. Several counties had multiple parks. A county is coded as containing a research park if there is at least one listing in either 1962 or 1966.
